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Abstract 
Data analyses in the life sciences are moving from tools run on a personal computer to 
services run on large computing platforms. This creates a need to package tools and 
dependencies for easy installation, configuration and deployment on distributed platforms. 
In addition, for secure execution there is a need for process isolation on a shared platform. 
Existing virtual machine and container technologies are often more complex than traditional 
Unix utilities, like chroot, and often require root privileges in order to set up or use. This is 
especially challenging on HPC systems where users typically do not have root access. We 
therefore present nsroot, a lightweight Linux namespaces based process isolation tool. It 
allows restricting the runtime environment of data analysis tools that may not have been 
designed with security as a top priority, in order to reduce the risk and consequences of 
security breaches, without requiring any special privileges. The codebase of nsroot is small, 
and it provides a command line interface similar to chroot. It can be used on all Linux kernels 
that implement user namespaces.  In addition, we propose combining nsroot with the 
AppImage format for secure execution of packaged applications. nsroot is open sourced and 
available at: https://github.com/uit-no/nsroot. 
Introduction 
Container and virtual machine technologies are vital for secure and portable execution on 
computing platforms such as clouds IaaS. For scientific computing the use of container 
technologies, such as Docker [1], rkt (https://coreos.com/rkt/) and Snapcraft 
(http://snapcraft.io/), have the potential to make data analysis applications easier to install, 
port, and use. Specifically, containers allow packaging the application with its 
dependencies in a self-contained container that can easily be executed on a wide variety 
of computing platforms. However, container technologies rely on operating system 
services to provide the application with a name space and protection from other 
application. Hence, these must rely on operating system features that may not be available 
in all kernels and distributions, or they may require root access. 
Our work is motivated by our experiences developing, deploying, and maintaining the 
META-pipe metagenomics data analysis service [2]. Such genomic data analysis is 
typically done through a collection of tools arranged in a pipeline where the output of one 
tool is the input to the next tool. The data transformations include file conversion, data 
cleaning, normalization, and data integration. A specific biological data analysis project 
often requires a deep workflow that combines 10-20 tools [3]. There are many libraries 
[4]–[6] with hundreds of tools, ranging from small, user-created scripts to large, complex 
applications [7]. Each tool has dependencies in form of libraries, but also data files such 
as specific versions of reference databases. These dependencies make it difficult to install, 
configure, and deploy a pipeline on a new computing platform. There are therefore recent 
initiatives, such as BioDocker (https://github.com/BioDocker) that aim to provide 
packaged genomics data analysis tools in containers.  
The cost of producing genomics data is rapidly decreasing 
(http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts), so it has become necessary to move the 
analyses from the single server typically used to high performance clusters or clouds [2], 
[3], [8]. Since porting and maintaining a deep data analysis pipeline on a cluster or cloud 
is time-consuming and requires access to a large amount of compute and storage 
resources, it is increasingly common to provide a pipeline as a data analysis service. 
Recent examples of such services include Illumina Basespace 
(https://basespace.illumina.com/home/index), EBI Metagenomics [9], our META-pipe 
[2] and other pipelines provided by the Norwegian eInfrastructure for Life Sciences 
(https://nels.bioinfo.no/). For such services security is important since the service may be 
used to process sensitive, scientifically valuable, or commercially valuable data on behalf 
of a user. This is further complicated since the pipeline consists of third party tools that 
may not have high code quality, that have not been properly tested, and that are executed 
as the same user on the cloud or HPC backend. So, it is especially important to isolate the 
individual pipeline tool executions from each other. Another challenge is that, unlike IaaS 
services, HPC systems are often provided as a traditional shared UNIX system where 
users typically do not have root access. This complicates the task of installing complex 
application dependencies. 
An ideal container solution would be one that would let us package all of our application 
dependencies inside the same Jar-file that we submit to our Spark cluster while at the 
same time provide full process isolation for the 3rd party tools that are run within the 
workflow. This would also make it easy to know which tools (and versions) were involved 
in processing a dataset since they would all be part of the application bundle. However, 
to our knowledge no existing solution existed that satisfies all needs. Existing virtual 
machine and container technologies are often more complex than traditional Unix 
utilities, like chroot, and often require root privileges. 
In this paper we discuss our solution for minimalistic process isolation. It solves the 
problem of isolating an application from the rest of the filesystem and it also lets us restrict 
an application from communicating with other applications via network or IPC by using 
the network- and IPC namespaces. Our solution, called nsroot provides process isolation 
by making use of Linux namespaces in order to provide an isolated root file system for a 
process (similar to chroot) while at the same time cutting it off the network. This enables 
us to run applications with all their dependencies is a single directory while at the same 
time providing extra security through extra process isolation. In addition, we can combine 
nsroot with AppImage container to provide a simple, packaged bundle for an application. 
Finally, we propose using nsroot with AppImage and package those inside a Java Jar file 
for easy submission to a Spark cluster. 
nsroot works on Linux kernels newer than 3.10, and we have successfully tested it on the 
Fedora 22 and Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. 
nsroot 
nsroot (https://github.com/uit-no/nsroot) is a process isolation tool that makes use of 
namespaces to allow an application to change the root directory. It is designed to be 
lightweight and minimalistic to ensure wide portability across Linux kernel versions and 
distributions. It can be used to run processes within their own virtual root file system, 
which in turn allows the caller full control over absolute paths that are referenced by the 
program. 
Unlike other container tools, like Docker, nsroot does not require any installation. Instead 
it can be packaged as part of an application bundle. 
Usage 
To use nsroot, we first create a new root file system containing the application and all its 
dependencies. The root filesystem can be created by for example setting up the 
application in a docker container and then using docker to export the application files and 
dependencies to the new root directory. Alternatively, the root file system can be 
manually created, or it may consist of a statically linked self-contained application. We 
also describe below how nsroot can be combined with AppImage to provide extra 
isolation for containers. 
Second, we create a new directory for the old root filesystem in a subdirectory of the new 
root. This is needed by the PIVOT_ROOT system call (http://man7.org/linux/man-
pages/man2/pivot_root.2.html) that changes the root directory. 
Third, we call nsroot with the same parameters as chroot to change into the new 
filesystem. We can also specify bind-mounts to mount existing directories into this new 
root file system. To further restrict which processes the contained process can 
communicate with we can apply the network and IPC namespaces. We can validate that 
the network namespace is used by calling ifconfig inside the container. 
Namespaces 
We implemented nsroot by using namespaces as described in the NAMESPACES man 
page (http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/namespaces.7.html). In particular, we are 
using mount namespaces in order to change the mount table for a single process tree and 
we are using the user namespace in order to do so without requiring root access 
(https://www.toptal.com/linux/separation-anxiety-isolating-your-system-with-linux-
namespaces). We also found a tutorial about mount namespaces useful for this project 
(https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/l-mount-namespaces). 
As described in the namespaces man page: “User namespaces isolate security-related 
identifiers and attributes, in particular, user IDs and group IDs […], the root directory, 
keys […], and capabilities […].  A process's user and group IDs can be different inside 
and outside a user namespace.  In particular, a process can have a normal unprivileged 
user ID outside a user namespace while at the same time having a user ID of 0 inside the 
namespace; in other words, the process has full privileges for operations inside the user 
namespace, but is unprivileged for operations outside the namespace.” 
In other words, the process can run with root privileges in a user namespace without 
actually having root privileges elsewhere. Summarized, our code does the following: 
1. Clone the process using the appropriate namespaces. This includes at least the 
user and mount namespaces (CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWNS) 
2. Subprocess bind-mounts the new root filesystem into a subdirectory in the 
new root (for example /path/to/newroot/mnt). 
3. pivot_root is called in order to make newroot the new root filesystem. The old 
root filesystem becomes available under /mnt 
4. User-specified shared directories are bind mounted from the old root 
filesystem (available under /mnt) into the new root file system. 
5. The old root filesystem (/mnt) is unmounted  
6. execvp is called in order to replace the current process image with an 
executable specified by the user. 
Implementation 
nsroot is implemented in C and it consists of less than 500 lines of code. It has no 
dependencies other than the kernel. User namespaces were implemented in the Linux 
kernel version 3.8. We have tested nsroot with Linux kernels newer than 3.10 (Fedora 22 
and Ubuntu 14.04). However, it does not currently work on CentOS since it does not yet 
support user namespaces (http://rhelblog.redhat.com/2015/07/07/whats-next-for-
containers-user-namespaces/). 
Related Work 
In this section, we describe related work in process isolation tools based on Linux user 
namespaces and container technologies. In addition, we discuss how containers are used 
for genomics data analysis. 
nsjail and firejail 
At the same time when we developed nsroot, other projects developed similar tools. nsjail 
(http://google.github.io/nsjail/) was started the day before nsroot, and firejail 
(https://firejail.wordpress.com/) had its first beta release in April 2014. Both nsjail and 
firejail uses Linux user namespaces, similarly to nsroot, for process isolation, and in 
addition they use seccomp-bpf to filter system calls. nsjail uses resource limits and 
cgroups to limit the CPU, memory usage, and address space sizes of applications. nsjail 
also provides virtual network inside the application (although this requires root access to 
setup). firejail natively supports the AppImage format. 
The main advantage of nsroot over nsjail and firejail is that nsroot maintains 
compatibility with the chroot command and it has a smaller codebase (since it has fewer 
features). We believe this makes the command line interface easier to understand and use. 
Containers and Virtual Machines 
Both Virtual machines (VMs) and containers are technologies used to provide an isolated 
environment for applications. They are both binaries that can be transferred between 
hosts. While a VM includes an application, its dependencies and an entire OS, containers 
share the underlying host OS and contain only the application and dependencies making 
them smaller in size. Containers are isolated processes in user space on the host OS (as 
described in https://www.docker.com/what-docker).  
In [10] Docker containers are shown to have better than, or equal performance as VMs. 
Both forms of virtualization techniques introduce overhead in I/O-intensive workloads, 
especially in VMs, but introduce negligible CPU and memory overhead.   
For genomics pipelines the overhead of Docker containers will be negligible since these 
tend to be compute intensive and they typically run for several hours [11]. 
Containers in Life Science Research 
Recent projects propose to use containers for life science research. The BioContainers 
(https://github.com/biocontainers) and Bioboxes [12] projects addresses the challenge of 
installing bioinformatics data analysis tools by maintaining a repository of docker 
containers for commonly used data analysis tools.  
Containers have also been proposed as a solution to improve experiment reproducibility, 
by ensuring that the data analysis tools are installed with the same responsibilities [13]. 
Future Directions 
We believe nsroot can be used to provide extra isolation for minimalistic container 
technologies. These can then be used to package and execute for example data analysis 
tools as Spark jobs. This combination makes it easier to port legacy genomics data 
analysis pipelines to the Spark framework. In this section we present our proposed 
solution. 
AppImage 
AppImage (http://appimage.org/) is a technology for packaging applications for Linux. 
An AppImage application is a single ELF executable file that contains all the application’s 
dependencies and it is self-contained. nsroot can be used in an AppImage to provide extra 
isolation via Linux namespaces. 
Using nsroot within an AppImage has several advantages. First, it provides software 
packaging to nsroot. Second, it allows to run less-than-secure AppImages in isolation. 
Third, nsroot removes the problem of absolute paths. Fourth, it increases security by 
stricter isolation, which is especially beneficial if the installed AppImage becomes old or 
unpatched. 
The above observations are also shared by the firejail 
(https://github.com/netblue30/firejail) tool that is implemented similarly to nsroot and 
that can already be used with the AppImage format.  
Spark Pipelines 
Bioinformatics workflows running on Apache Spark could benefit from using nsroot for 
isolating the execution of legacy 3rd party tools. In particular, we could package all of our 
application dependencies inside the same Jar-file that we submit to our Spark cluster using 
AppImage, and then use nsroot to provide full process isolation for the 3rd party tools that 
are run within the workflow. 
Teaching Tool 
We believe that the minimalistic design, and the 420 lines code, of nsroot makes it useful 
as a teaching tool. For example, nsroot could be used in a project about containers in an 
operating systems course. 
Conclusion 
We have presented our nsroot process isolation tool. It uses the Linux user namespaces 
to allow application processes to run with root privileges without actually having root 
privileges outside of the user namespace. We propose using nsroot for secure packaged 
application execution, and for Spark job distribution. 
Our work was motivated by our experiences developing a genomics data analysis service 
that we have designed for cloud execution. We plan to use nsroot, and the proposed Spark 
solution to install, configure, deploy, and securely execute the data analysis tools for user 
submitted data using a single cloud user. Although we focused on genomics data analysis, 
we believe our solution can also be used for data analysis pipelines in other fields. nsroot 
and the proposed solutions are especially suited for deep pipelines with potentially 
insecure third-party tools. 
As future work we intend to implement the proposed integration with AppImage and the 
Java jar file deployment. We also plan to explore the possibility of providing versioned 
datasets to ensure complete reproducibility of a pipeline using for example Pachyderm 
(http://pachyderm.io/), which is a project that provides version control for data and a 
containerized pipeline system. 
nsroot is open sourced and available at: https://github.com/uit-no/nsroot. 
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